Tasmanian court looks into employer's burden to challenge mental health claims
The Supreme Court of Tasmania recently dealt with a case that shed light on an important aspect of workers' compensation claims. The ruling addressed the question of who bears the burden of proof when an employer contends that a worker is not entitled to compensation payments under specific circumstances.
The decision touched on potential significant implications for both employers and employees in Tasmania, particularly concerning stress-related claims in the workplace.
It revolved around a dispute between a paramedic and his employer, Ambulance Tasmania, regarding a workers' compensation claim for a stress disorder allegedly triggered by an ongoing investigation into a breach of conduct.
The case centred on the interpretation of Section 25(1A) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. This section outlines situations where compensation is not payable for mental illnesses or disorders arising from certain reasonable actions taken by employers.
The key question was whether the worker had to disprove the applicability of these exceptions or if the employer had to prove them.
The dispute originated when the paramedic made a claim for workers' compensation in August 2021, describing his condition as a stress disorder.
The employer disputed the claim, and the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal (WRCT) initially held that a reasonably arguable case existed concerning the employer's liability. As a result, an interim order was made for compensation not to be payable.
The worker then referred his claim to the WRCT under Section 42 of the Act. This proceeding was pending before the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (TASCAT) at the time of the Supreme Court's decision.
The court delved into the history of the legislation, examining how the onus (burden) of proof was assigned before the 1995 amendments to the Act.
Prior to these changes, workers' compensation disputes were handled by a Workers Compensation Commissioner in the Court of Requests, with no specific legislative provisions regarding the burden of proof.
The 1995 amendments, introduced by the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Reform Act, established the WRCT and inserted Section 49(2) into the Act. This section explicitly stated the onus of proof requirements in proceedings before the Tribunal.
The court referenced several High Court cases to establish the principle that while a claimant asserting a statutory right bears the onus of establishing facts giving rise to entitlement, the opposing party bears the onus of establishing facts necessary to defeat or exclude that right.
The court said that the historical context played a crucial role in the court's interpretation of the current legislation.
The court emphasised that the introduction of Section 49(2) in 1995 was not intended to change existing arrangements regarding the onus of proof. Instead, it aimed to clarify the law in light of the establishment of a new tribunal system.
The court noted that if workers were required to bear the onus of proof for Section 25(1A) factors, they would logically also have to do so for Section 25(2) factors due to similar wording. This would lead to an unreasonable situation where claimants would need to disprove numerous matters in every case where liability was not conceded.
Importantly, the court referred to clause notes made available to Members of Parliament regarding the 1995 amendments.
These notes stated:
"The majority of the amendments proposed in this clause are consequential amendments resulting from the establishment of the Tribunal. Paragraph (c) states the onus of proof requirements in proceedings before the Tribunal. A worker will be required to prove the initial entitlement to a claim; the employer will have to prove that a worker is no longer entitled to compensation. This provision makes no change to the current arrangements; they aim simply to clarify the law."
In its conclusion, the court determined that Section 49(2)(a) should be interpreted as applying only to the proof of facts entitling a worker to compensation under Section 25(1), not to the proof of disentitling facts within the scope of Sections 25(1A) or 25(2).
The court stated:
"For these reasons, s 49(2)(a) must be interpreted as applying only to the proof of the facts entitling a worker to compensation pursuant to s 25(1), and not to the proof of disentitling facts within the scope of s 25(1A) or s 25(2)."
This interpretation aligns with the principle that exceptions or exclusions to a general rule typically place the burden of proof on the party seeking to rely on them.
As the court explained:
"It is also significant that, if workers bear the onus of proof in relation to s 25(1A) factors, they ought logically to bear the onus in relation to s 25(2) factors because of the similar wording of the two subsections. If the employer's contentions as the onus are correct, it would follow that, whenever liability was not conceded, the claimant would bear a burden of disproof in relation to each of the many matters listed in the two subsections. That situation would be unreasonable, to the point of absurdity."
The court's decision upheld the original determination that the employer bears the onus of proving that Section 25(1A) applies in cases where they seek to deny compensation based on this provision.
This ruling provides important clarity for both employers and workers in Tasmania regarding the allocation of the burden of proof in workers' compensation cases, particularly those involving mental health claims related to workplace actions.
